THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
125 (I917); Lindahl v. Supreme Court I.O.F., ioo Minn. 87,

io N.W. 358 (1907); Swe-

ney v. Northwestern Mitt. Life Ins. Co., 251 Ill. App. 1 (1928). The better view is that
not so great a degree of proof is necessary. Von Crome v. Travelers' Ins. Co., ii F.
(2d) 350 (C.C.A. 8th 1926); Modern Woodmen of America v. Craiger, 175 Ind. 30, 92
N.E. I13 (191o); Hawkins v. Kronich Cleaning, etc., Co., 157 Minn. 33, 195 N.W. 766,
36 A.L.R. 394 (1923) (overruling the Lindahl case); 23 Col. L. Rev. 286. This differ-

ence is due to the fact that the courts holding the former view consider the presumption as evidence.
HuBERT C. MERRICK

Practice-Power of Court To Amend Sentence at Subsequent Term-Probation
Act-[Federal].-One Antinori was sentenced to four years imprisonment in 1929, but
sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation under the Probation Act, 43
Stat. 1259, 126o (1925), i8 U.S.C. §§ 724-727 (1926). In 1931 Antinori's probation was
revoked and he was sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment. This sentence was
affirmed in United States v. Antinori, 59 F. (2d) 171 (C.C.A.

5 th 1932)

and the mandate

of affirmance was duly entered by the district court on July 18, 1932. On the same day
the defendant district judge undertook to amend the twelve months' sentence to imprisonment for one hour. Held, the trial court did not have power to amend the sentence after the mandate of affirmance had been duly entered and the term at which the
original sentence of twelve months had been imposed had expired. United States v.
Akerman, 61 F. (2d) 570 (C.C.A.

5 th 1932).

The problem here raised is with regard to the effect of the probation act on the federal court's power to amend sentence after the term at which sentence was imposed has
expired. Section 724, 18 U.S.C. (1926) provides for suspension of sentence and probation of the defendant, but:

".....

The Court may revoke or modify any condition of

probation or may change the period of probation." The district court had power to
enter the sentence of tvelve months imposed in 1931 even though that sentence was
imposed after the term of the original sentence had expired. Riggs v. United States, 14
F. (2d) 5 (C.C.A. 4 th 1926), certiorari denied in 273 U.S. 719, 47 Sup. Ct. 110, 71
L. Ed. 857 (1926); United States v. Antinori, 59 F. (2d) 171 (C.C.A. 5 th 1932).

The words of the statute are capable of several reasonable interpretations as to just
what power the court has over its judgments. Intrinsically the language of the statute
could be construed to impart to the courts the power to make what orders they deem
advisable, either as to probation or sentence, at any time within the period for which
the defendant might originally have been sentenced. Thus the court in the instant
case could have imposed the one hour sentence even after term because the period for
which defendant might originally have been sentenced does not expire until 1933. This
may be an extremely liberal interpretation of the language of the act but it is essentially
plausible, especially as, according to the cases, this is legislation of a highly remedial
character and as such is entitled to a liberal construction. Riggs v. United States, i4 F.
(2d) 5, 7, 9 (C.C.A. 4 th 1926); United States v. Chafina, 14 F. (2d) 622 (D.C. Ariz.
1926); Reeves v. United States, 35 F. (2d) 323 (C.C.A. 8th 1929); and see Beggs v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 179 Cal. 130, 133 et seq., 175 Pac. 642, 644 et seq.
(1918) (dissenting opinion), for a good discussion of the purpose and construction of

such legislation. Under this view the court would have power to make what orders it

RECENT CASES
deems advisable at any time before the maximum period for which the defendant might
originally have been sentenced has expired.
Another possible construction which may be put upon the statute is that which the
court in the instant case adopted. See page 570: "The provisions of the act were exhausted when probation was revoked and 'such sentence imposed as might originally
have been imposed.'" The court felt that the twelve months' sentence was final in the
same way that all criminal sentences were before the probation act and that the court
had, therefore, no power to change the sentence after the term at which it was imposed
had elapsed. Aekerson v. United States, 15 F. (2d) 268 (C.C.A. 2d D926); Scalia v. United
States, 62 F. (2d) 22o (C.C.A. Ist 1932).
A third possible interpretation of the language of the act is that contended for by
the government in United States v. Antinori, 59 F. (2d) 171 (C.C.A. 5th 1932), to wit,
that although the act gave the court the power to revoke probation and impose execution of sentence after the term had expired, still the court could not alter the sentence
which it had originally imposed. Due to the fact that much of the effectiveness of the
probation proceedings depends on the sentence hanging over the head of the defendant
and that for this reason the courts impose heavier sentences than they would if the defendant were not to be put on probation, this would work a hardship on the defendant
or would hamper the effectiveness of this remedy as administered by the court. Because this is remedial legislation and entitled to liberal interpretation and because this
view would seriously prejudice the effective achievement of the purpose of the statute,
it is believed that such a construction would be undesirable and palpably inconsistent
with the general purposes of the act.
The middle ground of the possible constructions mentioned herein (the one which
the court in the instant case adopts) would seem to be the best. The words of the statute do not lend themselves very happily to the construction that the court is empowered to change the sentence when the defendant is no longer on probation, unless the
words are expressive of very general powers, but such an interpretation seems to be at
least a strain on the language employed by Congress. The salient effect of probation,
however, depends so greatly on the indefinite and intimate phenomena of which the
trial court is exclusively cognizant that much may be said for the contention that the
trial court should be able to control the prisoner up to the time when he is either discharged or actually incarcerated, expiration of terms notwithstanding. The writer
feels, however, that such power must come from supplementary legislation and that the
court took the most reasonable and most easily justified of the possible constructions
available.
CiiARLs GRAYDON MEGAN

Suretyship-Liability for Default of Infant Principal-Damages-[Indiana].-Infant vendee of an automobile disaffirmed his conditional sales contract, returned the
chattel, and recovered the amount paid to the vendor, who now claims against the sureties on the vendee's purchase note. Held, that the vendor should recover the amount
of the note (which was substantially the contract price) and that title to the car should
pass to the sureties when the note or judgment is paid. McKee v. Harwood A utonzotive
Co., 183 N.E. 646 (Ind. 1932) affirming 162 N.E. 62 (Ind. App. 1928).

Where a person suijurisguarantees the obligation of, or becomes surety for a minor,

